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NVotes

THE ART OF SENTENCING---"Punislvment is, therefore, an arta very difficult 'drt". J. K. Mackay J.A. in B. v. Willaert (1953), 105
C.C.C. 172 at p. 176.
Study and training will usually produce at least technical proficiency in an art. In Canada there exists no formal system of training
magistrates and judges prior to their entry into the sentencing office.
Such training as does exist is found in the occasional review by a
superior court of the exercise of the sentencing function and consequent approval or correction by that superior body.
Is there material available for those who would become proficient
through self-directed study? Again there is no formal (i.e. official)
guide to sentencing or to a statement of the principles involved. The
Criminal Code does not deal with the purpose of sentencing nor the
criteria by which sentences are to be arrived at. Certain maxima
and minima are declared but with such broad limits that a great deal
of discretion is left to the sentencing officer. That such discretion
must be exercised judicially as opposed to whimsically is well settled,
and for this some criteria are essential. Such criteria as are available
are to be found in the judgments of the superior courts in the exercise
of their reviewing function.
It appears to be generally accepted by the superior courts in
Canada that the purpose of punishment is fourfold1 : (i) Deterrence
of the prisoner at the bar and others tempted to commit like offences;
(ii) Protection of the community by excluding the convict permanently
or temporarily from membership therein; (iii) Reformation; (iv)
Retribution.
With the exception of "retribution" the meaning of these terms
seems to be fairly clear. It is in striking a balance between these
four aims that the so-called "art" exists. However, before attempting
any examination of the process involved in striking such a balance,
the meaning of "retribution" as used by the courts must be briefly
considered. In its common meaning, retribution is synonomous with
vengeance and retaliation. That such is not the meaning attached
to it by our courts is implicit from
the judgment in Chils,2 and
3
explicit in this passage from Warner.
"It should be said at once that the purpose of ppnishment for crime
is not that, through the medium of a judge who is authorized by law
to impose it, vengeance may be wreaked upon the guilty for their crime,
as though crime was private in character. In the narrow sense a crime
is usually an offence against an individual, involving his person or his
property. No doubt the person against whom the offence has been
committed, in that narrow sense, or, if he loses his life by the deed, his
relatives and associates unconsciously conceive the idea that punishment
should be imposed upon the culprit, causing suffering to him which will
bear some proportion to their own, that is to say, that in the suffering
of the delinquent they may find some compensation for their own. In
the broader sense, in which the courts must regard it, crime is an offence
1 See R. v. Warner, [19461 O.R. 808, C.A.; B. v. Jones (1956), 115 C.C.C.
273 per Laidlaw J.A. (dissenting) at p. 277, C.A. (Ont.); R.v. Willaert (1953),
105 C.C.C. 172, C.A. (Ont.).
2 [1939] O.R. 9, C.A.
3Ante footnote 1.
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against the State and is punished by the State on much different
principles."

What then does retribution mean? Some clue at least is to be
obtained from the next paragraph of the report quoted above.
"[Punishment] is the expression of the condemnation by the State of
the wrong done to society. There must always be a right proportion
between the punishment imposed and the gravity of the offence. It Is
in that sense that it is said that certain crimes "deserve" certain punishments, and not on any theory of retribution."

To the untutored eye, "that sense" remains indisguishable from
"the theory of retribution." Help is to be had, however, from the
following paragraph from Wilaert4 referring to Bentham's Rationa
of Puniskment:
"The underlying and governing idea in the desire for retribution is In
no way an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, but rather that the
community is anxious to express its repudiation of the crime committed
and to establish and assert the welfare of the community against the
evil in its midst. Thus, the infliction of punishment becomes a source
of security to all and is elevated to the first rank of benefits, when it is
regarded not as an act of wrath or vengeance against a guilty or unfor.
tunate individual who has given way to mischievous inclination, but as
an indispensable sacrifice to the common safety."
Here retribution in the legal sense has been distinguished from

retribution in its lay meaning.

It is now equated with repudiation.

Unfortunately, "repudiation" in its generally accepted meaning makes
little more social sense in this context than does the discredited
"retribution". According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, "repudiate" means "disown, reject, refuse dealings with, deny". It is
difficult to see how repudiation in this sense can co-exist with such
well settled purposes of punishment as deterrence and reformation.
This is unfortunately an example of the muddled expression, if not
thought, which often characterizes judicial pronouncements on
sentencing. It is suggested that the word for which the learned
judges are reaching is "disapproval", most likely in the form of

"reprobation".

It would seem then that one of the stated functions of a sentencing officer is to express the disapproval or condemnation of the community. In this regard, it is submitted that insofar as this alleged

reprobation is not a disguised form of retribution, it can serve only
to make a scapegoat of the convict. That this notion of reprobation
is widely held can be seen from the view of eminent judges and

ecclesiastics collected by Sir Ernest Gowers in his book, "A life for
a Life?" The point
himself.
"Breaking the law
stand in no need of
likely to 5repeat the
element."
4

of view is, indeed, clearly put by Sir Ernest
must be punished, even though the offender may
reformation and neither he nor anyone else may be
offence. Retribution is a convenient name for that

Ante footnote 1.
5 A Life for a Life p. 115. See also the reference to a "torrent of indignation against the accused among all decent thinking people" in Warner, supra
n. 1. The use of the expression "decent thinking" suggests that the indignation was given effect to.
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It is further suggested that the condemnation of an act by the
community is a stage in the protection of society, precedent not
subsequent, to the conviction of an offender. In other words, the
condemnation by society of an act is expressed by including that act
in the category of crimes. Having done so, the purpose of sentencing
can only be to ensure that -the code so established is respected. In
other words, the purpose of sentencing is properly confined to the
protection of the community achieved by deterrence, reformation and
where necessary temporary or permanent isolation of the offender.
Leaving this matter of retribution, what factors are to be taken
into account by a sentencing officer in striking a balance between the
alleged four purposes? In Willaert it was laid down that:
".... in the exercise of judicial discretion regard should be had to: the
age of the prisoner; his past and present condition of life; the nature
of the crime; whether the prisoner previously had a good character;
whether it is a first offence; whether he has a family dependent upon
him; the temptation; whether the crime was deliberate or committed on
momentary impulse; the penalty provided by the Code or statute; whether
the offence is one for which under the Code the offender is liable to
corporal punishment and, if so, whether corporal punishment should be
imposed."

As to how this advice is to be translated into action, the reports
are silent. Such translation must consist basically of relating the
particular case to the penal facilities available. The purpose of this
note is not to expound the techniques of achieving such a translation,
but rather to indicate the lamentable absence of any such techniques
in our present jurisprudence. 7 It should be noted, however, that the
fault does not rest entirely with the courts. Until recently the penal
institutions have offered adequate facilities for deterrence and protection of the community-facilities for retribution thus have been
more than adequate while those for reformation have been almost
non-existent. Under these conditions, to sentence for reform would
be to express a pious hope. Further, it would appear that some
sentencing officers have had almost no knowledge of the penal facilities
available.
With the recent implementation of the Fauteux8 report on both
Provincial and Dominion levels, there is hope that facilities will
improve to a point where judges can impose meaningful sentences.
The first step in preparation for such a day must be to formulate a
policy of sentencing. This policy will be based on sociological rather
than legal precepts and it appears axiomatic that the action of the
executive in implementing the Fauteux report will be ineffective
unless the Courts accept the precepts of the Fauteux report as the
basis of their sentencing policy. For a court to sentence without
6 Ante footnote 1.
7 Plenty of good advice is available. See e.g. the magnificent symposium
in 23 Law and Contemporary Problems (1958) No. 3. References in the
reports to professional writing on penology are few and far between; but see
hilds, ante footnote 2, Jones and Willaert, ante footnote 1.
sReport of a Committee appointed to enquire into the principles and procedure followed in the Remission Service of the Department of Justice of
Canada (1956) the Queen's Printer, Ottawa.
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reference 'to the penal facilities is like an
eyes closed.
With the enunciation of such a policy,
sentencing might reasonably be anticipated.
seem that too much is left to the sense of
sentencing officer.
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artist painting with his
a certain consistency in
At the moment it would
fitness of the individual

"Between the minimum and maximum punishment for offences prescribed by the Criminal Code it is for the trial Judge, under all the
circumstances of the case, to impose such sentence as in his judgment
meets the ends of justice. The circumstances in each case are different,
and, therefore, it is impossible to standardize sentences ....
9
"There is no fixed principle that can be followed .

.

. Judges of course

frequently differ with regard to sentences. Where in the opinion of one
Judge a very heavy sentence is considered desirable, in the opinion of
another a more moderate sentence would be sufiicient."o
"In England the normal penalty in a case of this kind (rape) is five years
penal servitude. .

here....".

.

. Nothing approaching standardization

obtains

Consistency of principle does not mean standardization in any slotmachine sense. That the unexplained disparity of sentence is a source
of great bitterness among convicted persons has been judicially noticed
by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal.12
The great bulk of sentencing in Canada is carried out by magistrates.' 3 These men need guidance and under our system that guidance
must come from the superior courts.' 4 If the superior courts are not
prepared to give guidance, then part at least of the process must be
handed over to another agency of government. Although the Court
of Appeal in British Columbia has held improper the abdication by a
magistrate of his sentencing function to the Parole Board,' 5 the
Ontario Court of Appeal apparently approved such a practice in the
16
recent Bezeau case.
9 R. v. Young, [19331 O.W.N. 777 per Mulock C.J.
1o1. v. Brayden (1926), 46 C.C.C. 336 at 342 per Hayen C.J. N.B.

11 B. v. Gordon (1924), 25 O.W.N. 572 per Latchford C.J.
12 B. v. Christie (1956), 115 C.C.C. 55 at 57 per McNivin J.A.
13 According to Magistrate J. M. Goldenberg, Q.C., writing in (1958), 1
Can. Bar Journal at p. 78, 94.4% of all Canadians sentenced in 1954 were
sentenced in magistrate's court.
14 That the magistrates are aware of the problems is indicated by the
addresses of Magistrate B. W. Hopkins, Q.C., and W. B. Common, Esq., Q.C.,
printed in (1958), 1 Can. Bar Journal at pp. 33, 49.
151?. v. Courtney (1956), 115 C.C.C. 260. The magistrate had awarded a
long series of consecutive sentences saying that it was up to the Parole Board
to decide when the convict was to be released.
161?. v. Bezeau, [19581 O.R. 617, C.A.: "I am not satisfied that the learned
Chief Justice proceeded upon a wrong principle, or that the sentence of life
imprisonment imposed upon the appellant was clearly wrong and, having
granted the leave sought, I would dismiss the appeal.
I should like to add that the function of an appellate Court on an appeal
against sentence is to correct a failure of justice and not to exercise the
Crown's prerogative of extending clemency to a prisoner, or the powers of a
board of parole.
If there are circumstances arising later that make it proper to afford
relief to the appellant, that is a matter which can more properly be left for
consideration and action by the executive."

Per Schroeder J. A. at p. 621.
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Whatever be the solution, it must come soon if the promised
changes in the penal services are to have any effect. The modest proposals of this writer are that:
(1) sentencing be left in the hands of the courts. (This stems
from a district of administrative tribunals).
(2) superior courts lay down a sentencing policy related to the
penal institutions available.
(3) sentencing 'officers be required to acquaint themselves in
detail with the penal facilities available within their jurisdiction.
(4) instruction and advice be made available to all sentencing
officers as to the employment of such facilities in the implementation of the sentencing policy.
J. D. MORTON

*

ABUSE OF MONOPOLY REVISITED--''Now, every person of
common sense knows what is involved in patent actions and what
the expense of them is, and everybody knows that to be threatened
with a patent action is about as disagreeable a thing as can happen
to a man in his business, even if he be innocent of any infringement
of patent law."
For many years it has been well recognized that threat of an
action under a patent can be more damaging and ruinous even than
the action itself. There is no way of compelling the patentee to
bring his action; he is at liberty to wait until the end of the seventeen
year term for which his patent is granted before filing his statement of
claim, in the meanwhile dangling his patent, like the Sword of
Damocles, over the heads of his trade rivals. There are, of course,
other remedies2 available to a person whose business is hindered by
the existence of a patent but the real mischief, is not the existence
of the patent but the threats posed by the owner of it to the trade
at large. For this reason, the British Patent Act 3 provides a right
of action for an injunction and damages to any person aggrieved by
threats of a patent proceedings. There is no such provision in the
Canadian Patent Act 4 and it remains to mention what other remedies
are available to a party injured by such threats.
In 1945, Dr. Harold G. Fox reviewed 5 this situation, concluding
that there were three possible grounds on which to proceed: first,
under sec. 11(1) (a) and (c) of the Unfair Competition Act, 1932;6
* Professor Morton, M.A., LL.B. (Trinity College, Dublin), The King's Inns,
Dublin, and of Osgoode Hall, Barrister-at-law is a full-time member of the
Teaching Staff at Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 Sk nner v. Shew & Co., [18931, Ch. 413 at p. 424 per Bowen L.J.
2An action for impeachment of patents, an action for a declaration of
non-infringements, and an application to grant a compulsory license.
3 Patent Act, 1949, 12, 13 and 14, Geo. VI, c. 87, s. 65.
4 Patent Act R.S.C., 1935, c. 203, as amended by 1953-54, 2-3 Eliz. II, c. 19.
and c. 40, s. 15.
5 Fox, Abuse of Monopoly (1945), 23 Can. Bar Rev. 353.
6 Unfar Competition Act, R.S.C., 1932, c. 38, s. 7(a).

